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3ELECTING THE PRESIDENT
On 16 July 2019, Ursula von der Leyen was elected 
as the next President of the Commission by 383 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to 
327. The European Parliament which elected her 
was itself boosted by an unprecedented increase 
in overall voter turnout at the elections in May 
from 42% to 51%. Over the last few years, in part 
due to the financial crisis, a real European polity 
has started to emerge. Europe’s voters are paying 
attention. Whether they love or loathe the European 
Union, its citizens recognise its importance.
However, the newly elected European Parliament  
is more fractured than in the past, and will be less  
easy to manage. Moreover, the election of  
Ms von der Leyen has been perceived by some  
as a renunciation of the Spitzenkandidat process 
initiated in 2014 which many saw as an important 
step forward in making the EU more accountable.  
It is important to secure the legitimacy of 
the new European Commission by quickly 
establishing its credentials on matters of 
institutional and democratic reform.
While this more volatile state of affairs will 
actually strengthen the parliamentary nature of EU 
democracy, it increases the burden that will weigh 
on the woman at the helm of its executive. It is 
important, therefore, to secure the legitimacy of the 
new European Commission by quickly establishing 
its credentials on matters of institutional and 
democratic reform.  
PRIORITIES
The top priority of the President-elect must be to 
obtain in October a broader endorsement of her 
whole college and political programme than the 
one she secured in July. This will be based on her 
own political guidelines, “A Union that Strives 
for More”.1 It will also have to take into account 
the strategy of the European Council and the 
European Parliament’s failed attempt to write 
a Koalitionsvertrag. But her programme should 
be bolder than all of the above and acknowledge 
that building the European Union is very much 
unfinished business. Reforming the EU’s governance 
and democratic underpinnings must be a priority, 
requiring a response that is both immediate  
and strategic. 
The Union has many claims to be a success, but it 
is still a contested, even experimental polity. The 
2007 Treaty of Lisbon corrected several flaws in the 
EU’s make-up, but its entry into force at exactly 
the same time as the 2008 financial crisis impaired 
its implementation and exposed the incomplete 
nature of the European project. The more recent 
decision of the United Kingdom to leave the Union 
has shattered belief in the irreversible nature of 
integration. Unless remedial action is taken to 
rescue the European project, further disintegration 
is a real possibility. Many leaders, like French 
President Macron, talk of the need for a profound 
institutional renewal of the Union, but few are 
prepared to be precise and engage in a process that 
will lead to a new constitutional settlement.2  
SETTING THE AGENDA 
Heads of government, brought together in the 
European Council, have an important agenda-
setting role, but they tend to be resistant to radical 
change. While the euro crisis has furnished the 
European Council with far more executive power 
than the Lisbon treaty envisaged, the leaders have 
consistently been reluctant to address the more 
political and institutional issues. Constitutional 
reforms have been kept off the EU’s agenda, or have 
been taken up in crisis mode, too late. 
The most recent emanation of the European Council 
is “A New Strategic Agenda 2019-2024”, published in 
June as the culmination of three years deliberation 
– the ‘Bratislava process’ – under the chairmanship 
of Donald Tusk. Typically, the Strategic Agenda 
wills the ends but not the means – a common fault 
of EU summit declarations over the decades. The 
European Council intends the EU institutions to 
“work in accordance with the spirit and the letter of 
the Treaties”:3 the possibility of institutional reform, 
let alone treaty change, is not mooted. 
In the last five years, the Commission has been able 
to accomplish very little in terms of constitutional 
reform, apart from the initiation of the federal 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) and 
the launch of PESCO (Permanent Structured 
Cooperation) under the terms of the Lisbon treaty.4 
In other areas, such as the banking union, capital 
markets union and defence union, there has been 
intensive secondary legislation but very little that 
actually changes the balance of power between the 
EU and national authorities.  
Treaty fatigue has been a useful excuse for 
inaction. But now the context has changed.
The outgoing Commission has had recourse to 
building scenarios, but this turned out to be hardly 
more than an academic exercise because it never 
provided a method for delivering any scenario.5 The 
Commission’s report to the Sibiu summit in May 
2019 (part of the Bratislava process) focussed on 
communications policy and had little new  
of substance.
4Sadly, even useful instruments provided by the 
Lisbon treaty have not been exploited. None of the 
passerelle clauses of Lisbon has been utilised: these 
provisions allow the EU to shift away from rigid 
unanimity in the Council towards more democratic 
decision-making, involving co-decision with the 
European Parliament.6 Very few attempts have been 
made at legislating enhanced cooperation by a 
group of integrationist minded states. The 2015 Five 
Presidents’ Report on EMU has been lost from sight, 
leaving the EU ill prepared to face the next crisis.7 
And there has yet to be a deep strategic reflection on 
the import of Brexit.  
The EU needs a new method for debating 
and delivering changes of a constitutional 
nature. It is not enough for the EU 
institutions merely to promote unity and 
stability. They should also be committed 
to exercising confident leadership of the 
emerging polity.
We are well aware that the defeat of the 
constitutional treaty in 2005 was a big setback for 
those who hope for a federal union. Treaty fatigue 
has been a useful excuse for inaction. But now the 
context has changed. President Macron’s election 
in 2017 was a signal that ambition for Europe could 
be back. The increased turnout for the European 
Parliament elections is another encouraging sign. 
Nevertheless, the EU needs a new method for 
debating and delivering changes of a constitutional 
nature. It is not enough for the EU institutions 
merely to promote unity and stability. They should 
also be committed to exercising confident leadership 
of the emerging polity. We would urge the new 
Commission, therefore, to be ambitious and assert 
itself as the systematic driver of reform. Otherwise, 
EU reform will again be elusive.  
THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE  
OF EUROPE
The proposal of Ursula von der Leyen to establish 
a two-year ‘Conference on the Future of Europe’, 
starting next summer, has important potential. But 
the mandate and objectives of such a conference 
must be made clear if it is not to turn out to be yet 
another pointless exercise such as the ‘democratic 
conventions’ held in certain member states last year. 
The central purpose of such a conference should be 
to prepare the ground for a new Convention that will 
eventually be summoned to revise the EU treaties.8 
This round of constitutional change can learn 
lessons from the last exercise in treaty revision, 
twenty years ago, when both governments 
and parliamentarians were ill prepared. More 
transparency and citizen participation in crafting 
treaty amendments and a higher alertness to how 
transfers of power to the federal level might be 
regarded by public opinion will ease the politics 
around eventual ratification. Social media and 
modern technology will facilitate engagement with 
the wider public and boost the participatory nature 
of the exercise. We would expect that, profiting from 
the work of the consultative conference, the next 
Convention will be able to make definitive proposals 
for a constitutional settlement of a federal union. 
The treaty revision should be ready for democratic 
endorsement at the next elections to the European 
Parliament in 2024. 
Some changes cannot wait that long, however. 
The President-elect is therefore right to prioritise 
electoral reform. The legitimacy of the European 
Parliament, and of the EU more generally, can be 
greatly enhanced by the development of proper 
political parties at the European level. Pan-EU 
parties will be essential sinews of supranational 
democracy, acting as shock absorbers in the 
evolving federal system. We therefore welcome 
Ms von der Leyen’s commitment to helping the 
legislature initiate the necessary changes in primary 
and secondary EU law as soon as possible so that 
electoral reform will be in place in good time before 
the next elections.  
More transparency and citizen 
participation in crafting treaty 
amendments and a higher alertness to  
how transfers of power to the federal  
level might be regarded by public  
opinion will ease the politics around 
eventual ratification.
The granting of a second vote at the elections, in 
addition to the national or regional ballot, would 
allow a number of MEPs to be elected for a pan-EU 
constituency from transnational party lists. Such 
a reform will constitute a new civic right for EU 
citizens and fulfil the longstanding quest for a  
truly European, uniform electoral procedure.9 The 
concept of the Spitzenkandidaten makes every sense 
in the context of transnational lists, anticipating 
that the next Commission president could be 
nominated by the Parliament and elected by the 
European Council in an inversion of the current,  
unsatisfactory procedure.10
It is also necessary to introduce a formula for the 
automatic reapportionment of national seats among 
the member states before each new election to the 
Parliament.11 By ensuring fairer play, this reform 
will improve the stability of the EU’s representative 
5system, and meet the concerns expressed by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court about the 
current legitimacy of the European Parliament.12  
The President-elect is right to prioritise 
electoral reform.
 
EVER CLOSER UNION REVISITED
The EU has lived for its first decades on the 
presumption that steady integration coupled with 
gradual enlargement would lead it towards its 
historic mission of creating “an ever closer union”.13 
Each new treaty rendered the Union more state-like, 
while every new member state enriched its diversity 
and brought impetus to the integration process. 
Today, however, no matter how the Brexit saga plays 
out, the EU is left weaker, smaller and poorer by 
the decision of the UK to depart. Alongside Brexit 
is the knowledge that the 2004 enlargement has 
not gone quite according to plan. The link between 
widening and deepening has been broken. Some new 
member states are tempted to abandon the EU’s core 
principles of respect for the rule of law and judicial 
independence. Moreover, each of the EU’s current 
neighbourhood partnerships taking the form of 
association agreements which impose obligations in 
return for privileges is in some difficulty.
President Macron, among others, makes the point 
that the EU is at present too weak to contemplate 
further enlargement. So the EU needs to be 
inventive about its future institutional architecture: 
the concept of concentric circles of integration 
across the wider Europe is ripe for development. 
This implies a fundamental rethink of the EU’s 
internal organisation as well as its neighbourhood 
policy. The overriding objective should be a 
coherent system of dynamic association agreements 
(‘privileged partnerships’) that foster cooperation, 
manage conflicts, and encourage convergence. The 
EU should use its normative power to good effect. 
The strengthening of rule of law mechanisms inside 
the Union, as Ms von der Leyen proposes, will play 
its part in recalibrating relations with neighbours.  
DEEPENING ECONOMIC AND MONETARY 
UNION
Perhaps the area where the institutional flaws of the 
EU are most exposed is that of the single currency 
for the simple reason that no currency in the world 
functions properly without a sovereign government 
and budget to stand behind it. German Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl believed that the arrangements for 
economic and monetary union (EMU) established 
in the Treaty of Maastricht were only the first step 
towards fiscal union. Since then it has been Germany 
which has led the opposition in the Council to the 
completion of the EMU project. As the first German 
President of the Commission since Walter Hallstein 
retired in 1967, Ms von der Leyen will be in a unique 
position to change this, thus fulfilling Kohl’s ambition. 
The euro survived the financial crash of 2008 due to 
the diligence of the European Central Bank (ECB), 
but as its president Mario Draghi has pointed out, 
the Bank’s room for manoeuvre is limited. The 
various crisis management measures put in place, 
and the first steps taken towards banking union, 
have only reduced but not eliminated the risk of 
another crash of similar proportions. The EU is 
constrained by its treaty to coordinate national fiscal 
policies, but mere coordination cannot achieve what 
a common policy would. As a result, the decisions 
and instruments adopted at the EU level tend to be 
either pro-cyclical or inadequate. The eurozone has 
no fiscal capacity of its own. There is no common 
safe asset issued by the Union that would allow 
it to reap the benefits of an international reserve 
currency and to stabilise the monetary union against 
adverse economic shocks. Several initiatives pursued 
by the European Council, such as the 2012 fiscal 
compact treaty, have proven to be false trails.14  
The EU needs to be inventive about its 
future institutional architecture: the 
concept of concentric circles of integration 
across the wider Europe is ripe for 
development.
The most obvious feature of a shift from 
intergovernmental to federal governance of EMU 
would be the true communitarisation of the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM), allowing it 
to morph into a real EU treasury. The ESM reform 
currently proposed is a parody that achieves 
nothing. Ms von der Leyen would be well advised 
to stop this proposal in its track and instead 
initiate the transfer of the ESM to the Commission, 
surrendering its paid-in capital to the EU budget. 
This would precipitate a change of governance from 
intergovernmental unanimity (subject to national 
parliamentary veto) to the executive decision of the 
Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs 
(Treasury Secretary) under the strict control of the 
European Parliament. This radical change of tack 
would signal that the new Commission President 
takes the deepening of EMU with utmost seriousness 
and would restart the debate, practically stalled 
since 2012, on a stronger footing. 
Such a change of direction would have far-reaching 
consequences for the whole governance of the 
6Union. It would install a proper common backstop 
for the Single Resolution Fund. It would allow 
real progress to be made on the proposal for an 
unemployment insurance mechanism, which 
remains to date the only serious proposal to grant 
the monetary union a countercyclical stabilisation 
instrument, as well as offering citizens a claim on 
the EU for providing essential social services. 
We urge the new Commission to build a broad 
coalition in favour of these reforms and to take 
on German and ‘Hanseatic’ opposition to risk 
sharing among eurozone members. In order to 
build this coalition, Ms von der Leyen should not 
hesitate to propose treaty amendments that would 
normalise the conduct of economic policy, including 
reforms to protect public sector investment and 
to de-constitutionalise the Maastricht provisions 
concerning the excessive deficit procedure, 
effectively rewriting the fiscal compact of 2012.15 
This debate has already started in Germany as 
many recognise that the combination of strict 
Schuldenbremse at both Länder and federal level is 
an inadequate framework for fiscal federalism.  
THE BATTLE OF THE BUDGET
The Von der Leyen Commission will soon face some 
critical decisions, not least on the new multi-annual 
financial framework (MFF). The paucity of the 
current EU budget speaks for itself: it is a budget 
in name only, having virtually no resources of its 
own; it cannot borrow and has limited flexibility 
on spending. It is more a piggy bank under the 
control of strict parents than a serious budget for an 
emerging federal union.
We would urge Ms von der Leyen to press for an MFF 
that stretches for only five and not seven years. This 
will allow each new Commission and Parliament to 
address the revision of the medium-term financial 
plan, thus reinforcing the democratic character of 
the Union. In addition, the disbursement of EU funds 
should be made conditional on the full respect for 
EU law, including the independence of the judiciary 
and the stamping out of corruption.  
The paucity of the current EU budget 
speaks for itself: it is a budget in name 
only, having virtually no resources of its 
own; it cannot borrow and has limited 
flexibility on spending.
It is unlikely that the MFF will be agreed until the 
very last moment, under the German presidency of 
the Council of ministers in late 2020. This is because 
the decision on the regulation has to be taken by 
unanimity – unless it can be agreed unanimously to 
shift to qualified majority voting (QMV).16 One would 
expect the Conference on the Future of Europe to 
draw the obvious conclusion and seek to entrench 
the use of QMV.  
Until the European Parliament gains the 
power to co-decide the revenue side of the 
EU budget there will remain a yawning 
democratic deficit at the heart of the 
governance of the Union.
Likewise, there must be a parallel change to the 
decision-making procedure on the EU’s own 
resources.17 Until the European Parliament gains 
the power to co-decide the revenue side of the EU 
budget there will remain a yawning democratic 
deficit at the heart of the governance of the Union. 
No self-respecting national parliament would 
tolerate being deprived of tax-raising powers. 
The new Commission should insist that the two 
chambers of the Union’s legislature have co-equal 
rights to vote on the choices of both taxation and 
expenditure. The reform should be a flagship for the 
next bout of EU treaty revision. 
Moreover, the current proposals to give the eurozone 
a specific fiscal capacity are completely inadequate 
both in terms of scale and governance. The money 
foreseen is negligible; decisions as to its use would 
be based on a Commission recommendation in 
the form of a Council recommendation with the 
Parliament only informed; and the money would 
be spent by member states, at their discretion, on 
national projects laying claim to help convergence 
and competitiveness for the euro area. Only a treaty 
revision will make sense of this.18 
BETTER GOVERNANCE AT HOME  
AND ABROAD
We strongly welcome the Von der Leyen proposal to 
introduce QMV for law making in the field of energy, 
climate, social policy and taxation. This can be done 
by deploying the passerelle clauses. 
We recommend that her political programme puts 
a high priority on further development of the EU 
as an area of freedom, security and justice. She 
should also prepare for a debate in the upcoming 
Conference on the Future of Europe about a further 
conferral of competence on the Union with regard to 
immigration, both lawful and irregular. We support 
the proposal to expand the powers of EPPO and 
of OLAF, the European Anti-Fraud Office, into the 
field of counterterrorism. We hope for proposals to 
increase the powers of EU agencies and supervisory 
bodies, including the ECB, wherever appropriate in 
the interests of good governance. 
7An early test of ambition in the field of common 
foreign and security policy will be to oblige the 
Council to act by QMV, as the Lisbon treaty 
prescribes.19 Proposals have been made to upgrade 
the Political and Security Committee into a ‘European 
Security Council’. Nonetheless, it is naïve to think 
that a European defence union will emerge until such 
time as an EU military headquarters is established. 
In the short term, a group of states should undertake 
military tasks on behalf of the Union as a whole – for 
instance, to replace NATO in Kosovo.20 
Increasing the power of the executive  
must go hand in hand with more 
parliamentary accountability.
Increasing the power of the executive must go hand 
in hand with more parliamentary accountability. Ms 
von der Leyen’s proposals to strengthen systematic 
contact between the Commission and Parliament 
are excellent. We would also recommend the Spinelli 
Group’s proposal to replace the rotating presidency 
of the Council with more permanent chairs subject 
to the overall authority of the European Council.21  
THE CHALLENGE OF EU GOVERNMENT
The central question for the Conference and the 
next Convention is to know whether the EU can 
agree to install a tier of effective democratic 
government up above that of the member states. The 
position the Von der Leyen college takes is critical 
here, especially to illustrate how the emergence of 
more federal governance can protect the interests of 
smaller member states and respect the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality.  
The central question for the Conference 
and the next Convention is to know 
whether the EU can agree to install a tier 
of effective democratic government up 
above that of the member states.
The Union must assert boldly its own economic, 
political and security interests. But the assumption 
by the EU of strategic autonomy requires a federal 
executive capable of managing tiers of differentiated 
integration across the wider Europe; of taking 
horizontal action to foster transnational cooperation 
among its member states; and of taking vertical 
action to ensure efficient coordination between all 
levels of government, from the European, national 
and regional to local. 
The EU must work hard to persuade its citizens to 
approve a centralisation of authority. Fortunately, 
many people already know that the scale and 
complexity of current challenges transcend the 
capacity of the old nation states and national 
political parties. National jealousies about 
transferring powers up to the EU level look archaic 
when the EU must deepen its integration across 
many fields. A Union that enjoys more competence, 
adequate resources and effective institutions will 
deliver public goods convincingly. 
In good collaboration with Charles Michel, the new 
President of the European Council, Ms von der Leyen 
will have formidable authority to sway the direction 
of the heads of government over the next five years. 
Together they must insist that votes are taken by the 
European Council when the search for consensus 
becomes intolerably long.22 As an ex officio member  
of the European Council enjoying the support of  
the Commission and European Parliament, Ursula 
von der Leyen will be in a good position to stop 
unsuitable decisions and recruit her colleagues, many 
of them new, to support her concrete reform agenda. 
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